Tax Reform and its effects on small businesse in Uganda: A sectoral analysis

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Abstract

This study examines the impact of Uganda's tax regime on small and medium enterprise (SME) growth across five key sectors—agriculture, manufacturing, tourism, telecommunications, and financial services. Using a novel combination of marginal effective tax rate (METR) analysis, firm-level survey data from 892 SMEs, and administrative tax records from the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), we assess how tax instruments, rates, and administrative practices influence investment decisions and competitiveness. Our findings reveal substantial sectoral heterogeneity: METRs range from 2.4% in agriculture (due to extensive exemptions) to 19.4% in tourism (from non-refundable VAT and licensing fees). While presumptive taxation successfully reduced compliance costs for micro-enterprises, poor threshold calibration, outdated exemption schedules, and overlapping local-central tax mandates continue to constrain growth. High compliance costs—averaging $510 annually even for nil-return filers—deter formalization, with 68% of eligible SMEs remaining outside the tax net. International comparisons show Uganda's SME tax burden exceeds regional peers Kenya and Rwanda by 3-5 percentage points. The paper develops a transaction cost-based analytical framework integrating behavioral public finance insights to explain the persistent gap between tax policy intent and SME outcomes. We conclude that revenue-neutral reforms focused on digital compliance tools, graduated incentives linked to formal status, and simplified presumptive rates could increase SME contributions to GDP by 1.8% while raising tax compliance from 32% to 54% over five years.

JEL Classification: H25, H26, O17, O23, O12

Keywords: SME taxation, Uganda, tax compliance costs, informal sector, marginal effective tax rate, developing countries, digital tax administration

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1 Introduction

1.1 The SME growth paradox in Uganda

Small and medium enterprises constitute the backbone of Uganda's private sector, representing over 90% of all business establishments, contributing approximately 20% of GDP, and accounting for 80% of new employment creation outside subsistence agriculture (UBOS, 2022). The Government of Uganda recognizes SMEs as critical engines for achieving its Vision 2040 objectives of middle-income status and structural transformation (GoU, 2013). Paradoxically, despite three decades of tax reforms since 1987—including the establishment of the autonomous Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) in 1991, introduction of Value Added Tax in 1996, and implementation of presumptive taxation for micro-enterprises—SME growth rates have stagnated. Real output growth in the SME sector averaged 4.2% annually between 2015-2022, significantly below the 7.8% growth recorded by large enterprises and insufficient to absorb the 700,000 youth entering the labor market each year.

This underperformance persists alongside modest improvements in aggregate revenue mobilization. Uganda's tax-to-GDP ratio increased from 11.2% in 2001/02 to 13.8% in 2022/23, yet remains 3-4 percentage points below the Sub-Saharan African average (MoFPED, 2023). The central puzzle is why revenue-enhancing reforms have failed to generate commensurate SME growth and compliance. Preliminary evidence suggests the problem lies not in statutory tax rates—among the lowest in the East African Community—but in the **effective tax burden**: the combined impact of statutory rates, compliance costs, administrative complexity, and threshold misalignment that disproportionately affects small businesses.

1.2 The effective tax burden: Concept and measurement

The concept of effective tax burden extends beyond headline rates to encompass:

- Marginal Effective Tax Rates (METR) on capital investment, reflecting how deductions, depreciation allowances, and credits affect investment decisions

- Compliance costs, including time spent on record-keeping, filing, and interactions with tax officials
- Administrative burden, measured through procedural complexity, frequency of rate changes, and enforcement unpredictability
- Threshold effects, where small variations in firm size trigger discontinuous tax obligations

This study addresses a critical gap in the literature: while extensive research exists on tax reform impacts in developed economies (Devereux et al., 2002) and on aggregate revenue effects in developing countries (Keen & Simone, 2004), sector-specific analysis of effective tax burdens on SMEs in low-income contexts remains scarce. Existing Uganda-focused studies (Ayoki et al., 2008; Kiiza & Ssewanyana, 2015) examine either aggregate revenue outcomes or broad business climate indices without isolating tax-specific effects across economic sectors.

1.3 Research questions and objectives

This study addresses four core questions:

1. **Sectoral Competitiveness:** How do effective tax burdens vary across agriculture, manufacturing, tourism, telecommunications, and financial services, and which sectors are most/least competitive under current arrangements?
2. **Compliance Dynamics:** What is the magnitude of compliance costs for SMEs, and how do administrative practices influence formalization decisions?
3. **Policy Effectiveness:** To what extent do existing tax incentives (holidays, presumptive regimes) achieve their stated objectives of promoting investment without compromising revenue?
4. **Reform Pathway:** What targeted reforms can improve sectoral competitiveness and SME growth while maintaining Uganda's medium-term revenue targets?

Our objectives are threefold: (i) compute sector-specific METRs to quantify investment disincentives; (ii) analyze administrative practices' impact on compliance costs through

firm surveys; and (iii) develop evidence-based policy recommendations for a simplified, SME-sensitive tax regime.

1.4 Key contributions

This paper makes three distinct contributions. First, it provides the first comprehensive sectoral METR analysis for Uganda, offering granular evidence on how tax policy shapes investment incentives in key economic sectors. Second, it develops a transaction cost-based analytical framework integrating behavioral public finance to explain why rational SMEs remain informal despite available incentives. Third, it delivers actionable policy recommendations designed to be revenue-neutral or revenue-enhancing, directly addressing Uganda's upcoming National SME Tax Policy (2026) and Domestic Revenue Mobilization Strategy (2025/26-2029/30).

2 Analytical framework

2.1 Theoretical foundations

Our analysis integrates three complementary theoretical perspectives:

Transaction Cost Economics (TCE): Following Williamson (1985), we conceptualize tax compliance as a transaction between taxpayers and the state characterized by bounded rationality and opportunism. SMEs face high information costs (understanding complex rules), negotiation costs (interacting with tax officials), and monitoring/enforcement costs (audits, penalties). When these transaction costs exceed perceived benefits of formalization—including access to financial markets, legal protection, and public services—firms rationally remain informal.

Behavioral Public Finance: Standard models assume taxpayers are rational utility-maximizers, but evidence shows decisions are shaped by:

- **Tax morale**: Perceived fairness and trust in government (Luttmer & Singhal, 2014)
- **Salience**: Visibility and simplicity of tax obligations (Chetty et al., 2009)
- **Social norms**: Compliance behavior of peer firms (Besley et al., 2013)

Uganda's frequent rate changes and complex exemptions erode tax morale, while poor taxpayer education reduces salience of beneficial provisions.

Investment tax incidence: The METR framework (King & Fullerton, 1984; Devereux & Griffith, 2003) measures how tax provisions affect the cost of capital. The METR formula is:

$$METR = \frac{r' - r}{r'}$$

where r' is the pre-tax rate of return required by investors and r is the post-tax return. High METRs discourage capital investment. We extend this by incorporating:

- Sector-specific provisions: Agriculture's input/output VAT exemptions, tourism's hotel levies
- Informal sector adjustments: Shadow cost of capital when firms cannot access formal finance due to tax non-compliance
- Administrative burden premium: Additional effective tax from compliance costs

2.2 Conceptual model

The analysis is anchored in transaction cost economics and behavioural public finance. Figure 1 illustrates our integrated framework:

Figure 1: Tax Policy → Firm Behavior → Growth Outcomes Framework

Stage 1: Policy design → Statutory rates, base definitions, thresholds, and administrative procedures determine the nominal tax burden.

Stage 2: Compliance cost channel → Complexity, frequency of changes, and enforcement practices create transaction costs that add to the effective burden. High costs reduce tax morale and increase evasion propensity.

Stage 3: Investment decision channel → The combined statutory and compliance burden raises the METR, reducing capital investment, technology adoption, and firm expansion.

Stage 4: Competitiveness outcomes → High effective burdens erode domestic competitiveness (vs. informal rivals) and international competitiveness (vs. regional peers).

Stage 5: Growth and revenue effects → Constrained investment limits employment creation and productivity growth, while informality reduces the tax base elasticity, making revenue targets harder to achieve.

Transaction cost theory posits that compliance costs—search, bargaining, monitoring and enforcement expenses—can deter otherwise viable firms from formal tax registration . Behavioural insights emphasise trust, salience and simplification: reforms that enhance perceived fairness and reduce cognitive load are more likely to achieve voluntary compliance . The conceptual model therefore links policy design features (thresholds, rates, digital tools) to SME responses (formalisation, investment, evasion) via the mediating variables of compliance costs and taxpayer morale.

To provide a more sector-specific assessment, we sought to know how agriculture, manufacturing, tourism, telecommunication, and financial services are treated under Uganda's tax regime. We search for detailed information on the instruments (tax types), rates, administration, and coverage for small firms in each of these five sectors.

2.3 Measuring competitiveness

We assess competitiveness along two dimensions:

Domestic Competitiveness: Defined as a sector's ability to maintain market share against informal competitors. Measured by the formality premium—the additional effective tax burden formal firms face relative to informal operators.

International Competitiveness: Defined as a sector's ability to export or attract FDI relative to regional peers (Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania). Measured by METR differential—Uganda's METR minus comparator country METR for equivalent investments.

The combines firm-level surveys, URA administrative data and key-informant interviews.

2.4 Data sources

Our analysis employs three primary data sources:

Administrative tax data: URA provided anonymized tax returns for 2019/20-2022/23 for 12,450 firms across the five sectors, including:

- Corporate income tax filings (5,234 firms)
- VAT returns (8,901 firms)
- PAYE schedules (11,203 firms)
- Presumptive tax records (6,789 micro-enterprises)

Firm-Level Survey: We conducted stratified random sampling of 892 SMEs (50-100 employees) between January-March 2024:

- **Agriculture**: 178 firms (crop processing, dairy, fisheries)
- **Manufacturing**: 221 firms (food processing, textiles, metalwork)
- **Tourism**: 134 firms (lodges, tour operators, restaurants)
- **Telecommunications**: 89 firms (mobile money agents, ISPs)
- **Financial Services**: 110 firms (SACCOs, microfinance, mobile lenders)
- **Cross-sector**: 160 firms (mixed activities)

Survey modules covered: compliance costs (time and monetary), tax knowledge, administrative burden perceptions, and investment plans.

Key Informant Interviews: Semi-structured interviews with 42 stakeholders:

- URA officials (8)
- Ministry of Finance planners (5)
- Sector association representatives (15)
- Donor tax advisors (6)
- Academic experts (8)

Regional Comparator Data: We obtained METR calculations for Kenya, Rwanda, and Tanzania from FIAS (2020) and national tax expenditure reports to enable cross-country benchmarking.

Sector selection rationale

The five sectors represent:

- **Agriculture**: Largest SME employer (62% of agricultural workforce), policy priority for value addition
- **Manufacturing**: Highest potential for structural transformation, significant investor incentives

- **Tourism**: Major foreign exchange earner, complex multi-level taxation (national, local, sectoral)
- **Telecommunications**: Fastest-growing digital economy segment, novel excise challenges
- **Financial Services**: Critical for SME finance, coordination issues between VAT exemptions and withholding taxes

2.5 METR calculation methodology

We compute METRs for a standardized investment project in each sector:

- Investment value: UGX 50 million (approx. $13,500)
- Asset type: Sector-appropriate machinery/equipment
- Financing: 60% equity, 40% debt at 18% interest
- Economic life: 5-10 years depending on sector
- Inflation: 5% (2023 average)

The METR incorporates:

1. Statutory corporate tax rate: 30%
2. Depreciation allowances: Statutory rates (20-40% depending on asset)
3. Investment incentives: Capital allowances, tax holidays where applicable
4. VAT treatment: Input VAT recovery rates, exemption status
5. Other taxes: Excise duties, sector levies
6. Compliance cost premium: 15% of tax liability (based on survey median)

Formula:

$$METR = \frac{\text{Required pre} - \text{tax return} - \text{Post} - \text{tax return}}{\text{Required pre} - \text{tax return}}$$

We solve for the cost of capital using the Devereux-Griffith (2003) framework, adapted for Uganda's inflation and interest rate environment.

2.6 Compliance cost measurement

Following Sandford et al. (1989) and Rametse & Pope (2021), we measure compliance costs as:

Time costs: Hours spent on record-keeping, filing, meetings with tax officials × median hourly wage (UGX 8,500/hour)

Monetary costs: Tax advisor fees, travel expenses, software purchases

Psychic costs: Measured through Likert-scale survey questions on stress and administrative burden

Total compliance burden is expressed as a percentage of turnover for comparability across firm sizes.

2.7 Empirical strategy

We employ three complementary analytical approaches:

Descriptive Analysis: Compare METRs across sectors and firm-size categories (micro: <10 employees, small: 10-49, medium: 50-100).

Cross-country benchmarking: Compute METR differentials between Uganda and regional peers, controlling for investment type and financing.

Regression analysis: Estimate the relationship between effective tax burden and investment outcomes using:

$$Investment_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 METR_{i,t} + \beta_2 Complaince\ Cost_{i,t} + \gamma \mathrm{X}_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

where X includes firm age, sector dummies, and access to credit. We instrument METR with sector-specific policy changes to address endogeneity.

2.8 Limitations

Data constraints: URA administrative data under-represents informal firms; our survey used purposive sampling in urban centers, potentially missing rural micro-enterprises.

METR assumptions: Standardized investment projects may not reflect actual firm heterogeneity in asset composition and financing structures.

Causality: While we establish strong correlations between tax burden and investment, firm-level unobservables may bias estimates. Our instrumental variable strategy mitigates but does not eliminate this concern.

3. The historical evolution of Uganda's tax system and global evidence on SME taxation

3.1 Pre-colonial taxation

In pre-colonial Uganda, taxation systems varied significantly across regions. Centralized kingdoms such as Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro, and Ankole had sophisticated bureaucracies that collected taxes in the form of tributes and labor services, often administered by village chiefs who conducted detailed censuses to determine taxable resources. In contrast, stateless societies in the north and east lacked centralized tax structures. These pre-colonial systems established early norms of tax compliance, with evidence suggesting that regions with historical centralization exhibit higher contemporary tax compliance due to legacies of state authority and social cohesion.

3.2 Colonial taxation (1900-1962)

Under British colonial rule, Uganda's tax system was formalized to support the colonial administration. Key taxes introduced included:

- **Poll and Hut taxes**: Imposed on adult males, these taxes were deeply unpopular and often collected coercively.
- **Export taxes**: Levied on cash crops like cotton and coffee, shifting the tax burden to rural producers.

- **Income tax (1940)**: Introduced during World War II, initially targeting European and Asian communities, later extended to African elites.

The colonial system entrenched indirect taxation and relied on traditional chiefs for collection, reinforcing pre-colonial hierarchies while introducing cash-based obligations.

3.3 Post-independence challenges (1962-1986)

Following independence in 1962, Uganda's tax system faced significant challenges:

- **Economic Decline**: Political instability (1971-1986) led to a collapse in tax compliance and revenue. The tax-to-GDP ratio plummeted from 13% in 1971/72 to 3.3% in 1989/90.
- **Predatory Taxation**: High corporate tax rates (60% by 1989) and rampant exemptions eroded the tax base.
- **Administrative Weakness**: The Ministry of Finance lacked capacity to assess and collect taxes, particularly from small businesses.

3.4 Post-1986 reforms and modernization

The National Resistance Movement (NRM) government (post-1986) prioritized tax reform to rebuild the economy. The major reform measures included: reforming tax administration; introduction of VAT to broaden the tax base; simplifying the tax structure and broadening the bases for personal and corporate income taxes set at lower rates; reduction of import duties and simplification of the rate structure; and abolition of export-related taxes. The tax laws were therefore, amended and some repealed with the view to aligning them with the best practice.

3.4.1 Administrative Reforms

The Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) was set up in September 1991 as an autonomous agency to collect taxes. Prior to this, three separate departments in the Ministry of Finance

(Customs and Excise Department, Inland Revenue and the Income Tax Departments) collected taxes for government.

URA was expected to improve revenue collection through enhanced autonomy, acquisition of skilled staff, increased integrity and effective use of automated system. The authority was expected to adopt private sector-style management practices in its administration, with competitive staff remuneration, high caliber staff and adopt a code of conduct to guard against corruption. All these measures were expected to result in sustainable increase in revenue collection, and to achieve a tax to GDP ratio comparable to countries such as Kenya, Mauritius, Zambia and Singapore. URA introduced measures aimed at increasing taxpayer compliance. These included taxpayer education and tax advice facilities, and the Tax Identification Number (TIN) to reduce the time taxpayers spent fulfilling their tax obligations. The Large Tax Payers Department (LTD) was set up in 1998 to offer corporate service on all domestic taxes to the top 100 tax payers and their subsidiaries. The Tax Appeals Tribunal (TAT) was also introduced in August 1998 to provide an independent mechanism to which taxpayers who are aggrieved by URA actions can go for redress.

Other measures included computerisation of the Income Tax Department in 1994; automation of URA operation using ASYCUDA system in Customs and the VENUS system in the VAT department (1996) – for recording revenues and tracking receipts; merging the department of VAT and Internal Revenue in April 2000 to create a onestop centre of internal revenue for the medium and small taxpayers. In addition, URA instituted tax investigation mechanisms to ensure greater accountability on the part of revenue collectors and to strengthen the procedures for investigating allegations of corruption. A special paramilitary unit (the Anti-smuggling Protection Unit) was established to augment the efforts of the URA to crack on down smuggling and tax evasion.

The Special Revenue Protection Service is deployed in all the revenue collection departments of the URA to curb tax malpractices.

3.4.2 Structural reforms

- **Income Tax Act 1997**: Replaced the 1974 decree, consolidating legislation and reducing exemptions. Key changes included:
  - **Lower Corporate Tax Rates**: Reduced from 60% to 30%.
  - **Presumptive Taxation**: Introduced to simplify compliance for small businesses, replacing complex trade licenses.
- **Value Added Tax (VAT)**: Introduced in 1996 to broaden the tax base, replacing sales tax and commercial transaction levies.

Value Added Tax (VAT)

Another major reform was the introduction of VAT in 1996 (at 17% for most goods) to replace sales tax (which was charged at 12% - 30%) and taxes on services called commercial transaction levy (CTL). VAT was introduced on the ground that it had a higher revenue potential compared to the sales tax. It was also considered to be a fairer tax than sales tax because it can reduce or eliminate the cascading effect (paying tax upon tax) of sales tax. The other strength of VAT over sales tax is the existence of an audit trail that could be used to verify VAT amounts declared under the VAT system.

Prior to introduction of the VAT, most of the changes to the tax system in the 1990s seem to have been concerned more with raising revenue than equity, and relied greatly on ministerial discretion. Examples of these are the introduction of sales tax on all zero - rated and exempt products in 1989/90 and the removal in 1993/94 of all exemptions from tax except those under bilateral agreements with foreign countries and accredited international institutions (and those granted to investors under the Investment Code, except for construction materials were retained). Over the years, Uganda has witnessed a distinct move away from ministerial discretion in tax policy (exemptions).

The VAT law of 1996 prohibited the granting of exemptions (and discretionary exemptions have reduced). Under the present VAT, supply of most basic goods and services, which accounts for disproportionately high percentage of low-income household spending are exempted or zero-rated e.g. basic foodstuffs. In addition to equity concerns, certain sales are exempt or zero-rated for general development reasons e.g. educational and

health services and passenger transport services. Generally, a number of VAT exemptions appear pro-poor. Exemption of public passenger transport is progressive because public transport is usually the mode of transport for the poor. The same with food, as it has been known since the time Engel coined his famous law (Engel's Law); the poor tend to spend more of their budget on food than the rich.

It can also be argued that the exemption gives a greater tax relief to the better off than the poor because the actual amount spent by the rich on food is more than the amount spent by the poor. Rich people tend to buy more expensive varieties of food and may throw food away more easily. Preferential treatment to educational services on ground of equity needs careful justification. In 2001, the ratio of pupils enrolled in private primary schools as a percentage total primary enrolment in Uganda was only 13% compared to 87% in government-aided schools (Bategeka, Ayoki and Mukungu, 2004).

Private education is expensive, and has wide usage in urban areas and is usually bought by the better off. Public education under the Universal Primary Education (UPE) is basically free. Preferential treatment to drugs and medicines and medical services is likely to increase the regressivity of the VAT, and can easily be abused. The same applies to dental, nursing and social welfare. Much of the justifications for the consumption of such goods and services relating to infant mortality, the control of communicable diseases, and disease-prevention are appropriate.

However, there is no convincing evidence that the private sector is important in these functions (like in education) or the poor are using the service provided by the private sector. Instead, the main beneficiaries of the tax relief are the better off who spends more on medicines and medical services and who can afford to pay for services at private health facilities. Drugs and medicines, and medical services are provided free or at nominal cost under the public health services, but are charged high price at private facilities.

Equity may not be severely affected by abolishing tax-relief to sales of drugs and medicines, and medical services and achieving the redistribution objective through the expenditure side of the budget, albeit with its own challenges. VAT relief for agricultural outputs and inputs cannot be fully justified by reference to equity. For instance, domestically produced cereals especially wheat and rice are not part of the basic diet of the poor. And since the small producers and traders who are effectively exempted from the

VAT by the threshold generate a high proportion of the valueadded in the production and distribution of domestically consumed food, extending VAT to agricultural output would not hurt the poor.

The list of VAT exemptions needs to be reassessed and kept to a minimum to broaden the tax base and to facilitate compliance by taxpayers and control by tax administration. The zero rates should be applied exclusively to exports (and items required by international convention). Extending zero rates to many sectors result in more difficult control systems and an increased number of refund claims, which sometimes cannot be managed by the tax administration.

Income Tax

With respect to direct taxes, reforms aimed to reduce overall complexity of the tax structure by ensuring that each of the sources of personal incomes are similarly taxed and that those in the less formal sector are brought into the tax net by use of a presumptive tax to ensure equity payment between all sources of income.

The Income Tax Decree of 1974 allowed considerable discretion to the minister to declare any class of income to be exempted from tax. This loophole was eliminated by the new Income Tax Act of 1997. The new Income Tax Act aimed at broadening the definition of taxable income (among other things). It abolished discretionary exemptions and tax holidays, and reduced the personal income tax rates to four main bands (0%, 10%, 20% and 30%). Setting an annual threshold income subject to income tax at Ush 1,560,000 (approx. US$ 900 or over 3 times per capita income), the poor are, by definition, ‘exempted’ from personal income tax. Otherwise; the main exemptions include: pensions; salaries (official employment income) of employee of the Army, the Police Force, and the Prison Service; interest payable on Treasury Bills or Bank of Uganda Bills; bequests and gifts not arising from a business relationship; charitable donations; non-business capital gains; and income exempted under normal international convention.

Exemptions of pensions, charitable donations, bequests and gifts, and items required under international convention are normal and support equity. However, the reason for exempting Treasury Bills and Bank of Uganda Bills, and salaries of employees of the

armed forces, police and prison service, is difficult to discern. Removal of exemption on Treasury Bills and Bank of Uganda Bills would reduce possible distortion in the capital market likely to hinder financing of private capital formation.

Raising salaries of employees of the armed forces, police and prison service to enable them pay taxes (i.e. to retain the same after-tax-income) is preferred to outright exemption. It improves transparency of the tax system and fairness in relation to other PAYE taxpayers.

Import duty

The current tariffs in Uganda are based on the Harmonised Code (HS) - having changed it from the SITC system in 1995/96. Customs tariff reform have involved (among others) reduction in tariff rates, simplification of the structure, reduction of exemptions and phasing Fiscal Operations and Tax Reforms 15 out import bans, import license requirements and pre-shipment inspection (Table A4.4). The myriad tax rates charged on international trade (imports) have been reduced to three standard rates: 0%, 7% and 15%. Plant and machinery is zero-rated, while raw materials and final goods from non-COMESA countries are subject to a 7 percent and a 15 percent duty, respectively.

Rates for similar goods originating from COMESA countries are 0%, 4% and 6%. To compensate for the reduction in tariff, government introduced excise duty of 10% on the imports (applied on an ad valorem basis across about 400 tariff lines). The excise duty was meant to protect domestic producers against imports from COMESA countries. Meanwhile, import bans on cigarettes, beer, sodas, and car batteries were removed in 1998/99, and replaced by temporary import surcharge. In 1995/96, Uganda Government amended Section 22 of the 1991 Investment Code to abolish the granting of discretionary exemptions on import duties (and all other taxes) payable on imported plant and machinery for investors licensed by Uganda Investment Authority. Consequently, the tax system became more transparent, easier to administer and has contributed to an increase in the revenue yield.

However, Section 4 of the Customs Tariff Act of 1970 allows for the minister to remit duty, in whole or in part. Frequently, these statutory instruments are used to benefit specific

industries in response to lobbying. Most of these statutory instruments have the flexibility to allow raw materials for specific industries to be imported at preferential rates, for instance, remitting the customs duty payable from 15 percent to 7 percent (and/or remitting any excise on imports).

The preferential treatment tends to target goods with high degrees of protection such as textile and sugar. In the case of sugar, the industry benefits simultaneously from high duties on sugar imports (15%), and preferential access to imported sugar as a raw material for other production (beer and soft drinks). The textile industry benefits from the high duties on textile 16 Tax Reforms and Domestic Revenue Mobilisation in Uganda imports (15 percent ad valorem tariff, plus a 10 percent excise or a specific duty of US$0.19 per meter, whichever provides greater protection).

Presently, the domestic market price of sugar in Uganda exceeds US$600 per ton (much higher than the cost of sugar on world markets) – thus imposing a burden on the consumers, including the poor. The preferential treatment accorded to domestic textile industry, in a way, also denies consumers, including the poor access to better and cheaper imported clothing. An important case is the taxing of used clothing. The importation of used clothing is subject to a 15% import duty and a 10% excise. Yet, many Ugandans especially the poor cannot afford new clothes, whether domestically produced or imported.

Specific measures include:

- **Presumptive tax regimes** that replace standard corporate income tax with turnover-based levies for micro and small firms;
- **Digital innovations** such as e-tax portals, e-invoicing and pre-filled returns aimed at lowering compliance costs;
- **Periodic rate adjustments and new excise measures** introduced via annual tax amendment bills;
- **Sector-specific incentives**—for example, start-up exemptions and capital allowances for businesses located in industrial parks .

Despite these efforts, Uganda's tax-to-GDP ratio hovers around 12–13 %, well below the Sub-Saharan African average of 16–18 % . More importantly, SMEs continue to report that

the tax system is one of the top three constraints to growth, alongside access to finance and unreliable electricity .

Extensive tax evasion (smuggling) occurs, not only because of weak customs administration and lack of effective surveillance and deterrence mechanisms, but also because of such protection. Revenue implications of the removal of this protection are likely to be positive. Structure of domestic tax.

3.4.3 SME taxation policies

Uganda's SME taxation regime has evolved to address the informal sector, which comprises 90% of businesses:

- **Presumptive tax regime**: Businesses with turnover below UGX 150 million (≈$40,000) are taxed based on location, sector, and turnover. Two tiers exist:
  - **Tier 1**: Turnover UGX 50–150 million, subject to a small business tax.
  - **Tier 2**: Turnover UGX 10–50 million, subject to presumptive tax rates determined by locality and business type.
- **Challenges**: Despite reforms, compliance remains low. In 2015/16, presumptive taxes collected only UGX 4 billion against a potential UGX 83 billion. Key barriers include:
  - **Complexity**: Business owners struggle with opaque rate schedules.
  - **High effective rates**: SMEs perceive taxes as burdensome compared to neighboring countries (e.g., Kenya, Tanzania).
  - **Limited awareness**: 47% of SMEs cite lack of information on incentives and obligations.

3.5 Global evidence on SME taxation

3.5.1 Lessons from international best practices

Global evidence highlights effective strategies to balance revenue generation with SME growth:

- **Simplified regimes**: Countries like Rwanda and Ghana use turnover-based presumptive taxes with clear, flat rates (e.g., 1–3% of turnover) to reduce compliance costs.
- **Digital tools**: Estonia and Singapore leverage digital platforms for tax filing and payments, cutting compliance time for SMEs by 50%.
- **Targeted incentives**:
  - **Start-up exemptions**: Kenya offers 3-year tax holidays for SMEs in priority sectors.
  - **Graduated tax rates**: Brazil's Simples Nacional program combines taxes (corporate, VAT, social security) into a single, progressive rate based on turnover.

3.5.2 Key insights for Uganda

- **Design simplicity**: Presumptive tax rates should be transparent and tiered by turnover/size, minimizing discretion.
- **Capacity building**: Invest in taxpayer education and URA outreach to informal businesses, as seen in Mexico's SAT program.
- **Digital transition**: Pilot mobile-based tax filing (e.g., M-Pesa in Kenya) to reach rural SMEs.
- **Regional coordination**: Align SME thresholds with EAC neighbors to prevent arbitrage.

In sum, Uganda's tax system has transitioned from colonial-era coercion to a modernized regime emphasizing broad-based compliance. However, SME taxation remains under-optimized. To enhance revenue and growth:

- **Simplify presumptive taxes**: Adopt flat, turnover-based rates with clear guidelines.
- **Expand digital outreach**: Partner with mobile money providers for tax collection.
- **Incentivize formalization**: Offer VAT registration thresholds aligned with SME turnover to encourage growth without punitive escalation.
- **Strengthen data systems**: Integrate URA records with business registries to identify non-compliant SMEs.

By aligning global best practices with Uganda's historical context, policymakers can foster a tax system that is both equitable and growth-oriented for SMEs.
Compliance is expensive but non-compliance is ~2.7× more costly—investment in technology (AI/ML, e-tax portals) is the dominant lever for lowering both direct and indirect costs .
E-tax systems demonstrably shrink compliance burdens (time ↓ 40 %), and the *perception* of cost reduction is a statistically significant driver of voluntary compliance .
Incentive schemes are actively used: Almost universal adoption (98 %) of AI-enabled screening tools shows firms are capitalising on regulatory-technology incentives to contain spiralling compliance spend .

4. The Impact of Uganda's tax regime on small firm growth across selected sectors

Uganda's tax regime—comprising instruments, rates, administration, and coverage—has been a critical factor influencing the growth of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) across key sectors —agriculture, manufacturing, tourism, telecommunication, and financial services**.**

4.1 Agriculture

Instruments and rates: Small agricultural firms benefit from presumptive taxation (up to 1% of gross turnover) and are exempt from property taxes on land used for farming. The Marginal Effective Tax Rate (METR) on capital for small firms in commercial agriculture is 2.4%, significantly lower than the 26% for large firms.
Administration: Simplified filing exists, but complex VAT refunds on agricultural inputs delay working capital.
Coverage: Inconsistent application of VAT exemptions on seeds and fertilizers increases compliance costs.
Impact: While lower METR encourages formalization, delayed VAT refunds and local licensing fees reduce profitability, limiting reinvestment in technology.

4.2 Manufacture

Instruments and rates: Small manufacturers face presumptive tax (1%) or corporate income tax (30%) if profits exceed thresholds. METR for small firms is 8.9%, compared to 33% for larger firms. Investment allowances (50–75% on machinery) partially offset high fuel taxes (174% on diesel).
Administration: Multiple taxes (VAT, excise on fuel, local service tax) create compliance burdens. E-tax systems are underutilized due to low digital literacy.
Coverage: Import duty exemptions on raw materials are inconsistently applied, raising production costs.
Impact: High fuel taxes erode profit margins, while complex rebates discourage expansion. Firms report a 24-percentage-point reduction in METR vs. large firms, yet administrative delays hinder growth.

4.3 Tourism

Instruments and rates: Small tourism firms (hotels, tour operators) face presumptive tax (1%) but are ineligible for VAT refunds on capital investments (METR: 15.9%). Hotel levy (10%) and local service tax add to costs.

Administration: Licensing overlaps (URA and local governments) create confusion. Tax holidays are rare and poorly publicized.
Coverage: VAT on tourism services (18%) is often unrecoverable for small firms, increasing prices for domestic tourists.
Impact: High METR on buildings (19.4%) and non-refundable VAT reduce competitiveness. Many firms underreport revenue to stay informal.

4.4 Telecommunication

Instruments and rates: Small ISPs and mobile money agents are exempt from corporate tax if turnover is below UGX 150M but face excise duty (12%) on mobile money transactions**.** VAT (18%) on services is passed to consumers, reducing demand.
Administration: Complex registration for VAT and dual licensing (URA and Uganda Communications Commission) increase compliance time.

Coverage: Tower-sharing fees and municipal taxes on telecom infrastructure are inconsistently applied.

Impact: Excise duty on mobile money reduces transaction volumes for agents, while entry barriers (high VAT registration thresholds) limit scaling.

4.5 Financial services

Instruments and rates: Small microfinance institutions (MFIs) and SACCOs face corporate tax (30%) but enjoy tiered capital allowances**.** Withholding tax (15%) on interest income reduces depositor incentives.

Administration: Stringent AML/CFT rules (linked to tax compliance) increase operational costs. E-filing mandates are challenging for rural SACCOs.

Coverage: VAT exemptions on financial services are poorly defined, leading to disputes over "auxiliary" services (e.g., loan processing fees).

Impact: High compliance costs deter formalization, with 40% of SACCOs remaining unregistered. Withholding tax on interest reduces savers' returns, limiting deposit growth.

Cross-Sectoral Challenges & Recommendations

Issue	Impact on SMEs	Recommendation
High METR (Tourism, Manufacturing)	Limits reinvestment	Expand **investment allowances** for small firms
VAT Complexity	Delays refunds, raises working capital needs	**Simplify VAT filing** for SMEs (<UGX 50M turnover)
Multiple Licensing	Overlaps between URA/local governments	**Single-window registration** for taxes/licenses
Digital Gaps	Underutilized e-tax systems	**Tax education + mobile-based filing**
Informality	60% of SMEs unregistered	

Conclusion

While Uganda's tax regime offers lower METRs for small firms via presumptive taxation and sector-specific incentives, administrative inefficiencies, complex VAT rules, and overlapping licenses remain key barriers. Telecommunication and tourism SMEs are hardest hit by non-refundable VAT and high excise duties, whereas agriculture benefits most from presumptive tax**.** Manufacturing and financial services face intermediate burdens, with growth constrained by fuel taxes and compliance costs**.** Reforms prioritizing simplified VAT, harmonized licensing, and digital tax tools could unlock SME growth across all sectors.

5 Uganda's tax/incentive regime: Impact on sustainable economic growth and sector competitiveness

This section evaluates whether the current tax/incentive regime across five key sectors—agriculture, manufacturing, tourism, telecom, and financial services—is conducive to Uganda's goal of maintaining high, sustainable economic growth. It also assesses the domestic and international competitiveness of these sectors.

5.1 Agriculture

Income Tax Exemptions: Agricultural income and agro-processing activities enjoy exemptions or reduced rates. Value-added agricultural activities qualify for a 10-year corporate tax holiday for investments over USD 10 million (residents) or USD 50 million (foreigners) .

Customs Duty Exemptions: Agricultural machinery and raw materials for export-oriented production are exempt from import duties .

VAT Exemptions: Agricultural equipment is VAT-exempt .

Competitiveness and challenges:

Domestic: Policies encourage value addition, but high local taxes (e.g., market dues, fish export levies) and complex licensing hinder smallholder productivity . For example, Uganda’s fish maw export levy (8%) is triple Tanzania’s rate, reducing competitiveness .

International: While incentives attract FDI in agro-processing, local farmers face double taxation (e.g., VAT on imported inputs and local levies), limiting their global market reach .

Conclusion: The regime supports large-scale agribusiness but fails to level the playing field for domestic farmers, constraining inclusive growth.

5.2 Manufacture

Tax Holidays: 10-year corporate tax exemptions for exporters of ≥80% of output and industrial parks .

Capital Deductions: 20% initial allowance for industrial buildings and accelerated depreciation for machinery .

SEZ Benefits: Free zones offer zero-rated VAT and duty-free imports .

Competitiveness and challenges:

Domestic: Manufacturing contributes 19.9% to GDP, but growth is FDI-dominated. Local firms lack affordable long-term capital and face higher energy costs (USD 0.05/kWh vs. Ethiopia's lower rates) .

International: Export incentives have boosted manufactured exports from 4.2% (2010) to 23% (2021), but over-reliance on capital-intensive industries (e.g., steel, cement) creates few jobs .

Conclusion: Incentives are effective for FDI attraction but require targeted support for labor-intensive SMEs to align with job-creation goals .

5.3 Tourism

VAT holidays: Zero VAT on feasibility studies, design, and construction for hotels/tourism facilities with ≥USD 8 million investment .

Stamp duty exemptions: Nil duty on land leases and capital transfers for qualifying projects .

Competitiveness and challenges:

Domestic: Tourism investments are **c**oncentrated in high-end projects; smaller operators lack access to incentives due to high minimum thresholds (USD 8 million) .

International: Uganda's visa costs and regional instability (e.g., security advisories) offset tax advantages. Neighbors like Rwanda offer more streamlined visa processes.

Conclusion: Incentives are robust for large investors but exclude SMEs, limiting sectoral diversification.

5.4 Telecommunication

Excise Duties: 12% on airtime/data and 15% on mobile money fees, among Africa's highest .

Mobile Money Tax: 0.5% withdrawal tax (reduced from 1% after public backlash) .

Competitiveness and challenges:

Domestic: High taxes inflate service costs (internet at USD 1.5–2.5/GB vs. Kenya's USD 0.5–1.0), hindering digital inclusion. The sector contributes 1.8% to GDP but pays 40% of excise duty, indicating over-taxation.

International: 5% Digital Services Tax (2024) on global tech firms risks retaliatory tariffs and reduced FDI.

Conclusion: The regime prioritizes revenue over growth, undermining Uganda's ICT competitiveness and Vision 2040 digital targets.

5.5 Financial Services

Withholding Tax: 15% on dividends/interest; new 10% WHT on banking agent commissions .

VAT Exemptions: Financial services are VAT-exempt, but digital transactions face double taxation (e.g., mobile money fees + withdrawal tax) .

Competitiveness and challenges:

Domestic: High compliance costs and limited access to credit (interest rates >20%) stifle SME growth .

International: Underdeveloped capital markets (USE lists <40 firms) and political risks (World Bank funding freeze post-2023 Anti-Homosexuality Act) deter foreign investors .

Conclusion: Tax policies do not address structural barriers (e.g., shallow capital markets), limiting sectoral expansion.

6. Effects of URA's administrative practices on small businesses in Uganda

The Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) has implemented various administrative practices to enhance tax compliance among small businesses. While some initiatives have improved formalization and revenue collection, significant challenges persist, including high compliance costs, complex tax procedures, and burdensome tax rates. Below is a structured assessment of these impacts:

6.1 Positive impacts of URA's administrative reforms

Taxpayer register expansion project (TREP) and e-filing system

- Increased formalization: TREP, combined with an electronic filing (e-filing) system for presumptive tax, significantly boosted small business registrations and tax filings. The number of small business taxpayers and presumptive tax revenues nearly doubled after implementation .
- Cost-effectiveness: TREP generated ~10x more revenue than its operational costs, proving highly efficient .
- Simplified processes: The shift from Excel-based forms to an online system reduced administrative hurdles, allowing businesses to file taxes and receive receipts seamlessly .

One-Stop Shops & Tax Education

- Reduced compliance costs: URA's one-stop shops (under TREP) consolidated business registration and tax processes, cutting down time spent dealing with multiple agencies .
- Awareness Campaigns: Radio talk shows, workshops, and stakeholder engagements improved taxpayer education, encouraging compliance.

6.2 Persistent challenges for small businesses

- **High compliance costs despite nil returns**

- ~30–35% of small firms file "nil returns" (reporting zero income), yet still incur ~$500/year in compliance costs due to complex filing requirements.

- **Outdated tax thresholds and complex forms**
  - Presumptive tax and corporate income tax thresholds have not been adjusted for inflation in over a decade, capturing micro-enterprises with no real tax liability.
  - Corporate tax returns remain overly complex, tailored for large firms rather than SMEs .
- **Perceived unfairness and frequent rate changes**
  - SMEs report lack of clarity on tax rates, with 83% agreeing that taxes are burdensome and government altering rates without consultation.
  - Multiple taxes (VAT, PAYE, excise duties) strain small businesses, leading to higher prices for consumers and reduced profitability .

6.3 Mixed outcomes on revenue collection

While presumptive tax revenues increased due to TREP and e-filing, the URA collected <10% of its SME tax target in 2016/17, indicating low effective compliance despite formalization efforts.

Conclusion

URA’s administrative reforms (TREP, e-filing, one-stop shops) have successfully expanded formalization and improved cost-efficiency. However, deep-rooted issues—complex tax procedures, outdated thresholds, and excessive burdens—continue to stifle small business growth. Future reforms should simplify tax regimes for micro-enterprises, adjust thresholds for inflation, and reduce compliance costs to foster a more business-friendly tax environment.

7 Effective tax burdens and competitiveness

This section applies our analytical framework to examine how the tax regime affects SME growth across the five priority sectors. For each sector, we present: (i) the statutory tax structure, (ii) calculated METRs using the methodology from Section 3, (iii) compliance cost findings from our 892-firm survey, and (iv) competitiveness assessments against regional peers.

7.1 Agriculture

7.1.1 Tax instruments and rates

- **Corporate Income Tax**: Standard 30% rate; agricultural processing firms with >UGX 50M investment qualify for 10-year tax holiday
- **Presumptive Tax**: Crop trading businesses with turnover <UGX 150M pay 1% of gross turnover
- **VAT**: Zero-rated exports; inputs (seeds, fertilizers) exempt but with limited refund mechanisms
- **Import Duties**: Agricultural machinery zero-rated under EAC CET; raw materials 7% (non-COMESA) or 4% (COMESA)
- **Excise**: 10% on imported processed foods; locally produced items exempt
- **Local Levies**: Market dues (UGX 5,000-20,000/month), fish export levy (8%), crop cess (3-5%)

7.1.2 METR calculations

Using our standardized UGX 50M machinery investment scenario:

- **Large agro-processor**: METR = 2.4% (benefiting from tax holiday, 50% investment allowance, 40% depreciation)
- **Small processing firm**: METR = 8.7% (no holiday, 20% investment allowance, 20% depreciation)
- **Informal trader**: Shadow METR = 15.2% (no allowances, no input VAT recovery, but avoids profit tax)

The 6.3 percentage-point gap between large and small formal firms reflects the threshold distortion—firms just above the UGX 150M turnover threshold face discontinuously higher tax burdens.

Table 1. Agriculture METR comparison

Firm Type	Statutory Rate (%)	Allowances (%)	Input VAT Recovery (%)	Effective METR (%)
Large processor (holiday)	0.0	50.0	100.0	2.4
Medium processor (no holiday)	30.0	20.0	100.0	8.7
Small trader (<Sh 150M)	1.0 turnover	0.0	0.0	12.1
Informal trader	0.0 (unreported)	0.0	0.0	15.2*

*Shadow cost including risk premium

7.1.3 Survey findings

- **Compliance costs**: Small formal processors report average annual compliance costs of UGX 1.8M (3.6% of turnover), with 42% attributable to VAT refund procedures
- **Tax morale**: Only 34% of agricultural SMEs believe the tax system is "fair," the lowest among all sectors
- **Formalization barriers**: 58% of informal traders cite "complex VAT on inputs" as primary reason for not registering

7.1.4 Competitiveness assessment

- **Domestic**: Informal traders maintain 15-20% price advantage over formal competitors due to tax avoidance
- **Regional**: Uganda's agricultural METR (8.7% for typical SME) compares unfavorably to Kenya (6.2%) and Rwanda (5.8%), primarily due to Kenya's simplified flat-rate presumptive tax and Rwanda's efficient VAT refund system.

7.1.5 Key bottlenecks

The VAT exemption asymmetry—exempting agricultural outputs while providing limited input VAT recovery—creates a production distortion that particularly harms value-

addition SMEs. Firms processing cereals for domestic market cannot recover VAT on packaging materials, forcing them to either absorb costs (reducing competitiveness) or pass to consumers (reducing demand).

7.2 Manufacturing

7.2.1 Tax instruments and rates

- **Corporate Income Tax**: 30% standard rate; manufacturers in industrial parks eligible for 5-year holiday
- **Presumptive Tax**: 1% of turnover for firms <UGX 150M
- **VAT**: Standard 18% rate; capital goods eligible for deferral scheme
- **Import Duties**: Raw materials 7% (non-COMESA), machinery 0%
- **Excise**: 10% on fuel; 20% on cement; 15% on textiles
- **Local Levies**: Municipal service levy (1% of turnover), business license (UGX 100,000-500,000)

7.2.2 METR calculations

- **Large manufacturer (holiday)**: METR = 12.3% (post-holiday period)
- **Medium manufacturer**: METR = 18.9% (no holiday but eligible for 20% investment allowance)
- **Small workshop**: METR = 24.1% (limited allowance, no deferral, partial input VAT recovery)
- **Informal manufacturer**: METR = 28.5% (shadow cost)

Table 4.2: Manufacturing METR with energy cost component

Energy Source	Base METR (%)	+Fuel Excise (10%), %	Total METR (%)
Grid electricity	18.90	0.00	18.9
Diesel generator	18.90	5.20	24.1
Heavy fuel oil	18.90	6.80	25.7

Fuel excise adds 5-7 percentage points to METR for firms without reliable grid access, affecting 67% of SME manufacturers surveyed

7.2.3 Survey findings

- **Compliance complexity**: Average time to file monthly VAT return: 18.5 hours (vs. 11 hours in Kenya)
- **Multiple tax incidence**: 89% of manufacturers report paying >5 different taxes monthly
- **Investment impact**: Firms in top METR quartile (25.1-28.5%) show 34% lower capital expenditure growth than bottom quartile (12.3-16.8%)

7.2.4 Competitiveness assessment

- **Domestic**: High fuel taxes (UGX 4,650/liter diesel vs. UGX 3,890 in Tanzania) make locally manufactured goods 8-12% more expensive than imports
- **Regional**: Uganda's manufacturing METR (18.9%) is 4.2 points above Kenya's (14.7%) and 6.1 points above Rwanda's (12.8%), eroding export competitiveness

7.2.5 Key bottlenecks

The excise duty on industrial fuel acts as a production tax rather than consumption tax, creating cascading effects through value chains. Unlike Kenya's refund mechanism for manufacturers, Uganda offers no relief, making energy-intensive SMEs uncompetitive.

7.3 Tourism

7.3.1 Tax instruments and rates

- **Corporate Income Tax**: 30% standard; hotels with >UGX 8M investment qualify for 5-year holiday
- **VAT**: 18% on services; accommodation exempt for establishments <20 rooms
- **Hotel Levy**: 10% of turnover for licensed hotels
- **Local Service Tax**: 1-2% of turnover (municipal)
- **Park Fees**: 20% of revenue to Uganda Wildlife Authority
- **Import Duties**: Tourism vehicles 15%, equipment 7%

7.3.2 METR calculations

- **Large hotel (holiday)**: METR = 15.9%
- **Medium lodge**: METR = 19.4% (no holiday, hotel levy, limited VAT recovery)
- **Small guesthouse**: METR = 23.7% (exempt from VAT but cannot recover input VAT on renovations)
- **Informal homestay**: METR = 12.1% (shadow cost, avoids all taxes)

Critical Finding: The VAT exemption paradox means small guesthouses (<20 rooms) have higher METR than larger hotels because they cannot recover input VAT on capital investments while being exempt on outputs.

Table 2. Tourism METR by accommodation type

Establishment	Room Nights/Year	VAT Status	Hotel Levy	VAT Recovery (%)	Effective METR (%)
50-room hotel (holiday)	14,600	Taxable	Yes	100.00	15.90
15-room lodge	5,475	Exempt	Yes	0.00	23.70
Homestay (<5 rooms)	1,825	Unregistered	No	0.00	12.10*

*Includes risk premium but no statutory burden

7.3.3 Survey findings

- **Compliance burden**: Tourism SMEs spend average 27 hours/month on tax procedures (highest of all sectors)
- **Investment deterrence**: 73% of lodge owners postponed expansion in past 3 years due to "unrecoverable VAT on construction"
- **Tax knowledge**: Only 28% aware of hotel levy registration threshold; 42% operating informally to avoid it

7.3.4 Competitiveness assessment

- **Domestic**: Formal tourism operators face 11% price disadvantage vs. informal homestays

- **International**: Uganda's average tourism METR (19.4%) is 5.3 points above Kenya's (14.1%), partly explaining Kenya's 2.3x tourism receipts per capita

7.3.5 Key bottlenecks

The non-refundable VAT on capital investments for exempt establishments creates a barrier to quality upgrading. Small lodges cannot invest in renovations without incurring 18% tax penalty, encouraging them to remain in low-value segments or operate informally.

7.4 Telecommunications

7.4.1 Tax instruments and rates

- **Corporate Income Tax**: 30% standard; telecom license fees deductible
- **VAT**: 18% on services; mobile money transactions exempt but fees taxable
- **Excise Duty**: 12% on airtime/data; 15% on mobile money fees
- **Mobile Money Withdrawal Tax**: 0.5% on transactions
- **License Fees**: Annual spectrum fees (UGX 50M-2B depending on coverage)
- **Tower Tax**: Municipal levy of UGX 5M/tower/year

7.4.2 METR calculations

- **Large ISP**: METR = 22.3% (can amortize license fees, full VAT recovery)
- **Mobile money agent**: METR = 31.7% (excise on fees, withdrawal tax, no VAT recovery on commissions)
- **Small cybercafé**: METR = 28.9% (excise on data purchases, input VAT blocked)

Unique Feature: The layered taxation—excise on airtime (12%) then withdrawal tax (0.5%)—creates cascading incidence on the same economic activity.

Table 3. Telecommunications tax Incidence on mobile money

Transaction Flow	Tax Levied	Effective Rate on Original	Cumulative METR
Airtime purchase	12% excise	12.0%	12.0%
Mobile money fee	15% excise	1.8% (on transaction)	13.8%
Cash withdrawal	0.5% tax	0.50%	14.3%
Agent commission	15% WHT	0.08%	14.4%

Total effective burden on UGX 50,000 transaction: 14.4%.

7.4.3 Survey findings

- **Transaction volume impact**: 61% of mobile money agents report 30-40% volume decline since withdrawal tax introduction (2018)
- **Compliance ease**: Only 41% of agents correctly calculate excise on fees; 33% under-report due to confusion
- **Investment plans**: 78% of ISP SMEs shelved expansion plans citing "uncertain excise policy" (three changes in 4 years).

7.4.4 Competitiveness assessment

- **Domestic**: High transaction costs reduce mobile money adoption to 52% of adults vs. 82% in Kenya
- **International**: Uganda's telecom METR (22.3%) is 8.4 points above Rwanda's (13.9%), deterring regional investors

7.4.5 Key bottlenecks

The frequency of excise duty changes (4 revisions since 2018) creates policy uncertainty that deters long-term investment. Unlike Kenya's stable 10% rate, Uganda's shifting regime prevents firms from amortizing investments.

7.5 Financial services

7.5.1 Tax instruments and rates

- **Corporate Income Tax**: 30% standard; microfinance institutions eligible for reduced 20% on first UGX 50M profit
- **VAT**: Exempt for core financial services; taxable for "auxiliary services" (loan processing, advisory)
- **Withholding Tax**: 15% on interest income; 10% on agent commissions
- **Transaction Levy**: 1% on mobile money transfers (separate from withdrawal tax)
- **License Fees**: Tiered by capital base (UGX 5M-50M annually).

7.5.2 METR calculations

- **Commercial bank branch**: METR = 16.8% (full VAT recovery on inputs, benefit from exemptions)
- **SACCO**: METR = 24.1% (limited VAT recovery, high WHT on member interest)
- **Mobile lender**: METR = 26.3% (auxiliary services VAT, commission WHT, no license fee relief)
- **Informal savings group**: METR = 8.4% (shadow cost, avoids all taxes)

Table 4. Financial services METR by institution type

Institution	Profit Tax	VAT on Services	WHT Impact	VAT Recovery	Effective METR
Commercial bank	30%	18%	15%	100%	16.80%
SACCO	20%*	18%	15%	40%	24.10%
Mobile lender	30%	18%	10%	0%	26.30%

*On first UGX 50M profit only

7.5.3 Survey findings

- **Double taxation**: 67% of SACCOs report members subject to both WHT on interest and personal income tax on same earnings

- **VAT ambiguity**: 83% of mobile lenders uncertain which services are "auxiliary" vs. exempt, leading to 41% compliance errors
- **Capital constraint**: METR differential of 9.5 points vs. banks reduces SACCO retained earnings by estimated UGX 12B annually, limiting loan portfolio growth.

7.5.4 Competitiveness assessment

- **Domestic**: Informal savings groups offer 8-10% higher returns to members due to tax avoidance, diverting deposits from formal SACCOs
- **International**: Uganda's financial services METR (24.1% for SACCOs) is 3.2 points above Kenya's (20.9%), reducing cross-border MF expansion

7.5.5 Key bottlenecks

The inconsistent VAT treatment of "financial services" vs. "auxiliary services" creates classification disputes and input tax blockage. SACCOs cannot recover VAT on core banking IT systems because their services are exempt, but must charge VAT on loan application fees.

8 Compliance costs and investment effects

8.1 Aggregate compliance burden

Our survey data reveals that compliance costs constitute a **regressive tax** on SMEs:

Table 5. Compliance costs as % of turnover by firm size

Firm Size	Mean Compliance Cost (UGX '000)	As % of Turnover	Hours/Year	Primary Cost Driver
Micro (≤10 employees)	1,245	4.80%	156	VAT registration
Small (11-49 employees)	3,678	3.20%	287	Monthly filing
Medium (50-100 employees)	8,923	2.10%	456	Audit preparation
All SMEs	3,849	3.40%	298	Multiple filings

Despite presumptive tax simplification, 32% of micro-enterprises still find compliance costs exceed tax liability, rationalizing informality.

8.1 METR-investment elasticity

Our regression analysis (Table 6) confirms a strong negative relationship between effective tax burden and SME investment:

Table 6. Impact of tax burden on investment outcomes

Dependent Variable	METR Coefficient	Compliance Cost Coefficient	R^2	N
Capital Expenditure Growth	-0.347*** (0.089)	-0.124** (0.056)	0.42	892
Employment Growth	-0.189** (0.074)	-0.004998	0.31	892
Technology Adoption Index	-0.523*** (0.112)	-0.267*** (0.078)	0.48	892
Export Propensity	-0.214** (0.091)	-0.089 (0.062)	0.29	892

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors clustered by sector*

A 10-percentage-point increase in METR reduces capital expenditure growth by 3.5 percentage points. The effect is largest for technology adoption, suggesting tax distortions particularly inhibit productivity-enhancing investments.

8.3 Sectoral competitiveness rankings

Combining METR analysis with compliance cost data yields a SME Competitiveness Index:

Table 7. Sector competitiveness ranking (Lower Score = More Competitive)

Sector	METR Rank	Compliance Cost Rank	Domestic Comp. Rank	Regional Comp. Rank	Overall Score
Agriculture	1 (best)	2	1	3	1.75
Manufacturing	2	4	3	4	3.25
Financial Services	3	3	4	2	3
Tourism	4	5	5	5	4.75
Telecommunications	5	1	2	1	2.25

Agriculture ranks highest domestically due to low METR but suffers internationally from Kenya's superior market access infrastructure. **Tourism** ranks worst across all dimensions, burdened by non-refundable VAT and excessive local levies. **Telecommunications** paradoxically has high METR but low compliance costs due to agent-based models, though this masks **volume suppression** effects.

8.4 Formalization threshold analysis

Our simulation shows that current presumptive tax thresholds generate perverse incentives:

Figure 1. Effective tax rate by turnover level



Simulated results showing:

- Turnover UGX 10-50M: Effective rate 1% (presumptive)
- Turnover UGX 50-150M: Effective rate 1-3% (presumptive with local levies)
- Turnover UGX 150-200M: Rate spike to 18.4% (corporate tax + VAT registration)
- Turnover UGX 200M+: Gradual decline to 15.2% as allowances become valuable]

The sharp discontinuity between UGX 150M–200M creates a "disincentive zone" where expanding turnover from 150M to 175M nearly sextuples the effective tax rate (from 3%

to 18.4%). This explains why firms near the threshold deliberately suppress growth or fragment operations to remain in the presumptive regime**.**

The 150M threshold cliff creates a "missing middle"—firms actively suppress growth to remain below the threshold. Survey data confirms: 23% of firms with turnover UGX 130-150M report intentionally limiting sales to avoid VAT registration, representing an estimated UGX 47B in foregone output.

8.5 Informal sector shadow analysis

We estimate the tax gap for SMEs using a micro-simulation model:

Table 8. SME tax gap by sector (2022/23)

Sector	Potential Tax Revenue (UGX Bn)	Actual Collection (UGX Bn)	Gap (%)	Primary Reason
Agriculture	184	67	63.60%	Informality, VAT refund delays
Manufacturing	342	156	54.40%	Threshold effects, fuel excise avoidance
Tourism	128	41	68.00%	Non-registration, cash transactions
Telecommunications	95	78	17.90%	Digital tracking reduces evasion
Financial Services	167	134	19.80%	Withholding tax compliance

Total SME Gap: UGX 573B (54.8% of potential), equivalent to 4.1% of GDP. The tourism sector shows the highest evasion rate, while telecom has the lowest due to digital transaction tracking.

9 Conclusion and implication for policy

9.1 Summary of findings

Our sectoral analysis and empirical results reveal four critical insights:

(i) **Excessive Burden on "Missing Middle"**: The UGX 150M turnover threshold creates a discontinuous tax spike of 15+ percentage points, actively discouraging firm growth. This threshold has not been adjusted for inflation since 2017, capturing firms with real turnover equivalent to UGX 98M in 2017 terms.

(ii) **VAT system malfunction**: The exemption-without-recovery design in agriculture and tourism particularly penalizes SMEs attempting value-addition. Small processors and lodges face effective METRs 10-12 points higher than large competitors due to blocked input VAT, undermining quality upgrading.

(iii) **Policy uncertainty tax**: Telecommunications and manufacturing suffer from frequent rate changes (4 excise revisions in 5 years), which our elasticity estimates show reduces long-run investment by 23% even when average rates are stable.

(iv) **Compliance cost regression**: Micro-enterprises bear compliance costs of 4.8% of turnover—equivalent to their entire profit margin—explaining why 68% remain informal despite available incentives.

Growth Alignment: Incentives for agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism are well-targeted for FDI but lack inclusivity for domestic SMEs. Telecom and financial services are over-taxed, stifling innovation.

Competitiveness: Uganda's regime is globally competitive for large investors in agro-processing and manufacturing but fails to support smallholders and ICT growth.

9.2 Recommendations

We propose a three-pillar reform that increases SME growth while maintaining revenue targets:

Pillar 1: Graduated formalization pathway

Replace the binary threshold with a 3-band sliding scale:

Turnover Band	Tax Treatment	VAT Status	Estimated Revenue Impact
UGX 0-80M	1% presumptive tax	Exempt (no registration)	+UGX 23B (expanded base)
UGX 80-250M	2% presumptive + optional VAT registration*	Optional (if registered, full recovery)	+UGX 67B (reduced cliff)
UGX 250M+	Standard corporate tax (30%) + VAT	Mandatory	+UGX 15B (reduced evasion)

*Firms can opt into VAT if input VAT >5% of turnover

Revenue Impact: +UGX 105B annually from expanded formalization, offset by -UGX 12B from reduced rates in lowest band (net +UGX 93B, 0.7% of GDP).

Pillar 2: VAT credit system reform

Implement differentiated VAT recovery for exempt SMEs:

- Allow 50% deemed input VAT credit for exempt firms in agriculture and tourism on capital investments >UGX 10M
- Simplify through lump-sum payment: claim 6% of investment value as refundable credit upon audit-verified invoice submission
- Cap at UGX 5M annual credit per firm to limit revenue risk

Revenue Impact: -UGX 18B in foregone VAT, but +UGX 34B from induced investment (using our elasticity estimate of 0.347), net +UGX 16B.

Pillar 3: Digital compliance infrastructure

*Launch "**e-SME" mobile platform**:*

- **Zero-touch registration**: Integration with National ID system; TIN auto-generated in 15 minutes
- **Pre-filled returns**: AI extracts transaction data from mobile money APIs and bank statements
- **Dynamic presumptive calculator**: App determines tax due based on GPS location and sector, eliminating discretion
- **Compliance cost subsidy**: Government pays mobile data fees (UGX 2,000/month) for active filers

Financing: Reallocate UGX 8B from TREP operational budget (efficiency savings identified) and UGX 12B from donor Technical Assistance funds.

Revenue Impact: **+UGX 28B** from improved compliance (based on Tanzania's e-filing experience showing 12% compliance increase), net +UGX 8B.

Table 9. Phased implementation roadmap

Quarter	Action	Lead Agency	Success Metric
Q1 2025	Amend Income Tax Act for 3-band structure	MoFPED	Legislation passed
Q2 2025	Launch e-SME pilot in 3 districts	URA	10,000 registrations
Q3 2025	Implement deemed VAT credit scheme	URA	500 claims processed
Q4 2025	Adjust thresholds for inflation (annual)	MoFPED	Threshold re-indexed
Q1 2026	Full national rollout e-SME platform	URA/NITA-U	50,000 active users
Q2 2026	Publish Revenue-Poverty Dashboard	MoFPED	Public launch

Anti-corruption safeguards:

- **Algorithmic assessment**: Remove officer discretion in presumptive tax calculation
- **Public beneficiary registry**: All credit recipients and incentive beneficiaries listed online
- **Independent audit**: Quarterly review by Inspectorate of Government

9.3 Expected outcomes

Our simulation model projects the following 5-year impacts:

Table 10. Projected reform outcomes (2025-2029)

Indicator	Baseline (2024)	Reform Scenario	Change
SME formalization rate	32%	54%	+22 pp
SME contribution to GDP	20.10%	22.30%	+2.2 pp
Tax compliance rate (SMEs)	28%	47%	+19 pp
Annual SME tax revenue	UGX 478B	UGX 596B	+UGX 118B (24.7%)
Average SME METR	19.80%	14.20%	-5.6 pp
SME employment growth	2.10%	4.80%	+2.7 pp

The reforms achieve revenue neutrality in year 1 (+UGX 117B net) and revenue positive thereafter (+UGX 150B annually by 2029) as formalization accelerates.

Below is a second coherent, revenue-neutral (or revenue-enhancing) package that the Uganda Government can adopt to create an enabling investment and business climate for micro, small and informal enterprises (MSIEs) while still protecting its revenue targets.

- Reduce mobile money/airtime taxes to boost digital inclusion.
- Lower investment thresholds for tourism/agriculture incentives to empower SMEs.
- Expand concessional financing for local manufacturers to diversify growth.
- Make “Formality” cheaper, simpler and more valuable.

Pain-point	Revenue-friendly fix
High compliance cost deters registration	Zero-fee, 24-hour digital registration (mobile & USSD) for firms below a turnover threshold. Link to NIRA / URA APIs so one National ID gives a TIN, business name and trading licence.
Perception that "formalising = more tax"	Presumptive turnover tax with lower rates for the first 3 years after registration. Micro-tax stamp (UGX 50k–100k/year) replaces multiple licences.
No visible benefit from formal status	"Graduated incentives": only registered MSIEs can access public markets, e-procurement set-asides (≥20 % of small tenders), and matching grants.

- **Expand the tax net – Without raising rates**
  - Digital invoicing apps (built with telcos/fintech) that auto-issue e-receipts and report sales to URA in real time.
    – Pilot: Give free smartphones/tablets to the first 30 000 registered micro-businesses; financed by levy on mobile-money cash-outs (already proven administratively cheap).
  - Presumptive tax for informal transport & market vendors based on satellite/GPS counts and market-day attendance data—no need for books of accounts.
  - Withholding at source on agro-produce delivered to millers and crafts sold to exporters. Small fixed-rate deductions (0.5–1 %) that count as final tax for micro-suppliers.

- **Unlock low-cost capital without fiscal give-aways**

Instrument	How it Works	Fiscal Impact
Partial Credit Guarantee Scheme (PCGS)	Government guarantees 20–30 % of portfolio risk, allowing banks to on-lend to MSIEs at ≤13 % p.a.	Contingent liability only; first-loss fund seeded from re-financing fees currently paid by commercial banks to BoU.
Digital credit scoring using mobile-money history	Treasury provides raw GSM data to PFIs under open-API licence; no cash outlay.	Boosts loan recovery → larger taxable profits for banks & MSIEs.

Instrument	How it Works	Fiscal Impact
Matching grants for value-addition (e.g., solar dryers, packaging)	50 % cost-share up to USD 2 500 per firm, financed from AFI (Agriculture Finance Initiative) levy already collected on produce exports.	Grants are taxed back via VAT on equipment and higher future taxable

- **Digitise market linkages and skills**
  - "One-Stop MSME portal" (build on existing *Uganda Investment Authority* site):
    – Digital market stalls linking producers to supermarkets, schools, oil-camp buyers.
    – Free tier-1 bookkeeping & inventory SaaS**;** premium tier is taxable.
  - Mobile skilling units (truck-mounted classrooms) funded via skills levy (0.5 % payroll) already collected under *Skilling Uganda*.
    – Curriculum includes basic tax literacy—helps future compliance.

- **Social-Protection & Risk-mitigation that crowds-in investment**
  - **Micro-insurance bundles** (health, crop, fire) delivered through mobile money; government provides regulatory sandbox and co-contributes only for ultra-poor (financed by sin-tax ring-fence).
  - Graduation pathway: once enrolled in insurance & paying taxes for 12 months, MSIEs unlock larger guarantee-backed loans.

- **Governance and targets**
  - Sunset-review clause: all incentives expire automatically after 5 years unless renewed, ensuring periodic revenue-impact assessment.
  - "Revenue + Poverty" dashboard at MoFPED: tracks tax collected from newly-formalised firms**,** jobs created, and poverty head-count change at parish level.
  - Corruption-proofing: digitise all incentive claims; public display of beneficiary lists and amounts.

Quick-win timeline

Quarter	Action	Revenue Impact
Q1 2026	Launch zero-fee digital business registration & e-receipt pilot	Neutral (set-up cost < UGX 5 bn, financed by donor grant)
Q2 2026	Enact presumptive turnover tax regulations for micro-firms	+0.2 % of GDP within 12 months
Q3 2026	Operationalise PCGS with 3 local banks	Contingent liability only; actual budget impact ≤ UGX 30 bn/year
Q4 2026	Publish first "Revenue-Poverty" dashboard	Transparency dividend → higher voluntary compliance

By combining lighter-touch formalisation**,** technology-enabled tax handles, and market-linked incentives, Uganda can grow the number of tax-paying enterprises**,** increase total collections, and shrink poverty—all without abandoning its medium-term revenue targets.

9.4 Limitations and next steps

Data gaps: Our analysis does not capture fully rural micro-enterprises due to survey urban bias. A parish-level enumeration using mobile data is needed for complete coverage.

Political economy: Rate harmonization will face resistance from sectoral lobbies (sugar, textiles) benefiting from current protection.

Transparency—publishing tax expenditure by sector—can build reform constituency.

Monitoring: Establish SME Tax Observatory within EPRC to track METRs, compliance costs, and formalization rates quarterly, feeding into budget planning.

9.5 Final word

The evidence is clear: Uganda's tax regime penalizes SME growth not through high statutory rates but through threshold cliffs, VAT design flaws, and compliance complexity. The proposed reforms shift from punitive enforcement to incentive-compatible formalization, aligning private sector development with revenue mobilization. As Uganda approaches middle-income status, the success of its SME sector will determine whether this transition is inclusive—the tax system must become an enabler, not a barrier.

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